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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAN PARKINSON; CYNTHIA
PARKINSON; LINDA HATCH, and
GUY HATCH,

AppealNo.991027-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendants/Appellants,
vs.

MICHAEL MORRIS; ELIZABETH
MORRIS; and JOHN COVEY,
Plaintiffs/Appellees.

COPY

APPELLANTS' REPLY TO APPELLEES' OBJECTION TO PURPORTED
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Judgment, and Order Denying Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial, by the Fourth Judicial District Court for
the State of Utah, Utah County, Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr., District Court Judge

Appellants Dan and Cynthia Parkinson, and Linda and Guy Hatch, pursuant to Rule 24 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, reply to Appellees' objection to Appellants submission
of supplemental authority.
Appellants' submission of supplemental authorities pursuant to Rule 24 (j) was proper,
and this Court can-and should-consider the authorities set forth therein. Rule 24 allows a party
to bring supplemental authority to the Court's attention and places no restriction on the nature of
the authority. The use of non-legal authority by appellate courts is well recognized and there is
no legal or procedural bar to its use.

tfta/i r ' ^ * ^ 0

Nevertheless, Appellees argue, without support, that Rule 24 does not contemplate nonlegal authority and that Appellants are attempting to "inject irrelevant, immaterial, and
unfounded factual material into this appeal." (Appellants' Objection at 3.) Appellees' objection
is unfounded for three reasons: 1) there is no legal or procedural bar to using non-legal
authorities, either in a brief or in a supplementation, 2) the forms submitted by Appellant are not
factual evidence, but show a customary way of protecting attorney's fee clauses from abrogation
clauses in real estate contracts, and 3) Appellants properly submitted the supplemental authority.
Non-Legal Authority Is Proper and Should Be Considered by this Court.
For almost a century, American Appellate Courts have accepted and used non-legal
materials to assist in making decisions. In her article Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of
Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 University of San Francisco Law Review 197-235
(2000), Ellie Margolis notes that in 1908 "Louis D. Brandeis, the future Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court" used non-legal material in the case oiMuller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
1908): "In defending the constitutionality of an Oregon statute restricting the number of hours
women could work in a day, Brandeis presented all of the existing social science research on the
detrimental impact of long work hours on the health of women." Id. at 199, n. 12. (For the
Court's convenience, a copy of Ms. Margolis' Article is attached to this Reply.)
Ms. Margolis' article shows that appellate courts need, and routinely use, non-legal
materials to provide context and information relevant to the decisions they are asked to make.
Ms. Margolis further shows that there "are no procedural or evidentiary rules that prevent a
lawyer from citing factual information." Id. at 203.
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Appellants have provided the Court with information relevant to the customary usage of
provisions in standard Utah real estate contracts that permit an attorney's fee provision to survive
in the face of an express abrogation clause. This Court undoubtedly has the power to take
judicial notice of the existence of standard contracts in use in the state of Utah that expressly
preserve attorney's fees in the presence of an abrogation clause.
Appellants' Supplemented Relevant Non-Legal Authority, Not Irrelevant Factual Material.
Appellants' supplemental authority would have been proper had it been submitted in
Appellant's brief. Appellant is not submitting information that is part of the factual record of this
case. As Appellees admit in their objection, the forms submitted by Appellants are different
from the contract in this case. (Appellees' Objection at 2.) Appellants do not claim that these
contracts have anything to do with the record in this case. They are not submitted as facts or
evidence. The submitted forms simply provide this Court with information about standard Utah
real estate clauses that expressly preserve attorney's fees. This information is properly used by
this Court to provide context as to whether the contract and language used by Appellees
preserves a party's right to attorney's fees.
Appellants Properly Submitted Supplemental Authority.
Appellants supplied their non-legal authority in the manner specified by Rule 24(i) and
by the Appellate Court Clerk. Rule 24(i) does not specify that only legal authority may be
supplemented. And a contrary interpretation makes no sense; if the Court can consider standard
Utah Real estate contracts in connection with this appeal, it should be able to consider them
whether they are referenced in a brief or through Rule 24 supplementation.
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For these reasons, Appellant asserts that it properly submitted supplemental authority and
requests this Court to consider this authority accordingly.
DATED this\jT3ky of September, 2000.
HILL, J^ffi^ON & SCHMUTZ

'I
Attcjmeys for Defendants/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the J^2 day of September 2000, they caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following:
Mark O. Morris
Snell & Wilmer, LLP
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Sent Vyr.
vf Hand -Delivery
__^__ Facsimile
/
Mailed (postage prepaid)
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Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal
Materials in Appellate Briefs
Ellie Margolis

Articles
Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of
Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs
By ELLIE MARGOUS*

TT HAS LONG BEEN recognized that appellate courts must sometimes stray from the traditional role of applying previously existing
law and venture into the realm of creating new law.1 Once controversial, it is now "conventional wisdom . . . to observe that judges not only
are charged to find what the law is, but must regularly make new
law."2 Courts must assume this "legislative" function in several types of
cases, ranging from cases requiring the application of vague statutory
or common law rules to cases that raise novel issues to which no existing rule can conceivably apply.3 These are the cases that are most
likely to reach higher-level appellate courts. In these cases, judges
must move beyond the most typical forms of reasoning—rule-based
and analogical reasoning—and employ other methods, such as nor-

* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A., Wesleyan
University, 1987; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, 1990. I wish to thank my
colleague Michael Smith for getting me started on this project, as well as my colleagues Jan
Levine, Kathryn Stanchi, Susan Dejarnatt, and Jane Baron for their insights and
suggestions on drafts of this Article. Thanks also to Roxanne Paul for her excellent
research assistance. This Article was supported by a grant from Temple University School
of Law.
1.

See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE O F THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1921); Note,

Social and Economic Facts — Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts,
61 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693-94 (1948) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
2. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 331,555 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].

3.

See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058-59 (1975).
197
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mative and policy-based reasoning. 4 In this way, judges arrive at new
rules of law of general applicability.5
Introduction
In determining what the law should be, judges must often look
beyond the traditional sources of legal authority: cases, statutes, procedural rules, and administrative regulations. Analysis of existing rules
may not clearly provide a direction for a court to take. The court may
need information about the customary way of doing things in a particular community, the accuracy of a particular scientific test, the expected psychological response to a particular circumstance, or other
information of a factual nature. 6 For example, in imposing a common-law duty on a psychiatrist to warn individuals threatened by a
dangerous patient, the court may need general information about psychiatrists' ability to predict dangerousness in their patients. 7 In other
words, the court may need information similar to the information
generally available to the legislature in enacting a statute. This is not
information typically contained in sources of legal authority, and it
may not be part of the trial record below.8 This does not mean, however, that judges are limited to an analysis of only those facts on the
record—particularly when formulating a new legal rule.
Other sources to which judges may turn include science, empirical studies, social and psychological theory, history, and current
events. When used for the purpose of developing a rule of law, these
sources are commonly known as "legislative facts." As originally defined by Kenneth Culp Davis, legislative facts are those that "inform [ ]
4. See Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in
Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7 (1996). Edwards identifies five forms of reasoning commonly employed by judges: rule-based, analogical, policy-based, consensual normative, and
narrative. See id. at 9-10.
5. See Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 694. The author notes that, while cases in which
the court must create new law are relatively few, these cases "take on special significance,
since their effect, being legislative, will not be confined to the immediate parties." Id.
6. See id. at 693.
7. See, e.g., Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 449-50 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1991)
(refusing to impose duty to warn because psychiatry is an inexact science). The court referred to empirical studies to support its conclusion that psychiatrists cannot predict dangerousness with any degree of certainty. See id. There is no evidence that the appellants
provided any empirical information to the contrary.
8. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945,952 (1955) [hereinafter Davis, Judicial Notice] ("[WJhenever a tribunal is engaged in the creation of law or of
policy, it may need to resort t o . . . facts, whether or not those facts have been developed on
the record.").
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a court's legislative judgment on questions of law and policy."9 They
"help the tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to
exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take."10 Legislative facts can play an important role in the development of a rule of law, particularly in the creation of a new rule.
As the world we live in grows more complex and cases raise more
novel and challenging issues, appellate courts are increasingly turning
to legislative facts as a source of authority.11
Lawyers have presented legislative facts to appellate courts in the
form of the "Brandeis brief,"12 since before the coining of the term
legislative facts. In spite of this, it appears that, in general, lawyers do
not make effective use of non-legal materials in support of policy arguments in briefs. According to a study conducted by attorney-sociologist Thomas Marvell, in a representative sampling of briefs, seventy
percent devoted almost no space to argument based on social facts.13
In spite of this, the majority of attorneys whose briefs were analyzed
believed it was a good idea to make policy arguments, and recognized
that the court made use of social facts.14 Marvell concluded that the
reason for this was twofold: first, the attorneys were not geared toward
using factual material in arguments about what the law should be;
and, second, many attorneys believed they could not put factual information in their briefs if it had not been placed in evidence at trial.15
Although MarvelTs study was conducted twenty years ago, anecdotal
evidence suggests that these attitudes continue to prevail among prac9. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, An Approach]. Davis first coined the
term "legislative facts" to distinguish them from adjudicative facts. He developed these
concepts further in subsequent articles. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text
10. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 8, at 952.
11. See Frederick Schauer 8c Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1080,1108 8c app. (1997) (documenting increasing citation to non-legal
materials in United States Supreme Court cases over a number of terms).
12. The term "Brandeis brier is named for a brief submitted by Louis D. Brandeis,
the future Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In defending the constitutionality of an Oregon statute restricting the number of hours women could work in a day, Brandeis presented all of the
existing social science research on the detrimental impact of long work hours on the
health of women. See Brief for the Defendant in Error (No. 107), reprinted in 16 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT O F THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 63 (Philip B. Kurland 8c Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
13.

See THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 173 (1978).

14. See id. zt 190.
15. See id. at 190. Although the attorneys were unfamiliar with the concept of using
facts to support arguments about the law, they were quite comfortable with the idea of
using empirical data at the trial level. See id.
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tiring attorneys.16 This clearly raises the question of why lawyers are
not better informed about the use of legislative facts to support policy
arguments.
In recent years, many scholars have focused extensively on how
courts make use of legislative facts.17 These articles are primarily theoretical, and focus on the role of legislative facts in legal decision-making. They address issues of jurisprudence, 18 the scope of judicial
notice, 19 the role of social science in law,20 empirical studies of courts'
use of legislative facts,21 and use of legislative facts in amicus briefs.22
There do not appear, however, to be any articles written from the perspective of the advocate drafting a party brief.23 Despite the extensive
treatment of legislative facts, there has been virtually no scholarly discussion of whether or how lawyers should make use of legislative facts,
particularly in the context of policy arguments. Instead, lawyers are
left to draw inferences from the scholarship about how they should
respond to an issue. Likewise, practitioner-oriented materials which
address brief-writing contain very little discussion of the use of legisla16. The author informally questioned several attorney friends and colleagues about
this issue. Their responses were quite similar to those mentioned in the Marvell study.
17. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980)
[hereinafter Davis, Facts]; Peggy Davis, There Is a Book Out. . ."; An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987); David L. Faigman, "Normative
Constitutional Fact-finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation,
1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75; George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical
Implications ofJudges Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence
During the Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 291 (1998); Ann Woolhandler,
Bethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. I l l (1988).
18. See, e.g., Karst, Woolhandler, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 8; E. F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a
Study of Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 210 (1967).
20. See, e.g., John Monahan 8c Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating,
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan 8c
Walker, Social Authority]; Laurens Walker 8c John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) [hereinafter Walker 8c Monahan, Social
Frameworks],
21. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 13, at 192 (studying state supreme court's use of
empirical information); Davis, supra note 17, at 1547-92 (studying courts* use of psychological parent theory in custody cases); Schauer 8c Wise, supra note 11.
22. See Michael Rustad 8c Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993).
23. There are some articles that focus on the issues for amici in drafting appellate
briefs, but none of these addresses whether or how this connects to the drafting of the
party briefs. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morris, Private Amici Curiae and the Supreme Courts
1997-1998 Term Employment LawJurisprudence, 7 WM. 8C MARY BILL RTS J. 823 (1999); Rustad
8c Koenig, supra note 22.
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tive facts to support policy arguments.24 Finally, a review of books used
in law school legal writing courses reveals no such discussion.25
This article grew out of my attempt as a teacher, to find scholarly
support for the approach to supporting policy arguments in appellate
advocacy and brief-writing that I and other colleagues have been
teaching.26 Having found none, this article explores the theoretical
and practical issues involved in using non-legal materials as support
for policy arguments. It is a first step in encouraging lawyers to make
more effective use of these materials in the appellate brief. Starting
with the premise that, for good or ill, courts are using non-legal, extrarecord factual material in developing new rules of law, this article addresses the issues lawyers face in deciding when and how to use this
information.
This article discusses why lawyers should be better informed
about their ability to use non-legal materials in appellate briefs, and
when use of non-legal materials may be particularly advantageous.
Part I reviews reasons it is appropriate to introduce non-legal materials27 at the appellate stage, particularly in support of policy arguments. It reviews both theoretical and practical concerns of which
24.

See, e.g. STERN, ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 555-56 (7th ed. 1993) (noting

that legislative facts do not "play a large part in most litigation" and briefly describing the
Brandeis brief); ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 277-80 (2d

ed. 1989) (defining legislative facts and describing "Brandeis brieF as a tool used largely to
rescue an inadequate trial record). Neither of these treatises provides any discussion of
when it may be advantageous to use legislative facts, or how to do so effectively.
25.

See, e.g.t RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING O N APPEAL (revised 1st ed. 1996) (no spe-

cific discussion of policy arguments or legislative facts); CAROLE C. BERRY, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY: BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 64 (1998) (two pages devoted to nonlegal materials); LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING—PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND OR-

GANIZATION 107 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing policy-based reasoning, but no discussion of nonlegal materials as support); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRIT-

ING 271-72 (3rd ed. 1998) (discussing the importance of policy arguments, but not how to
support them); DIANA V. PRATT, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 321-24 (3d ed.

1999) (section on sources of public policy includes one paragraph on non-legal materials);
HELENE S. SHAPO ET. AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 198-202 (4th ed. 1999) (sec-

tion discussing types of policy arguments, but not how to support them).
26. I have been teaching appellate advocacy for eight years, both in thefirst-yearlegal
research and writing course, and in an advanced appellate advocacy course in which students brief and argue cases pending before the United States Supreme Court
27. For clarity of discussion, I will refer to "non-legal materials'* rather than "legislative
facts" when discussing their use to support policy arguments. The term legislative facts
encompasses a broader use of factual material than discussed in this article. See infra notes
103-28 and accompanying text "Non-legal material* refers to factual or theoretical information that is not part of the trial record. This information can come from disciplines such
as science, sociology, statistics, economics, and psychology. It can also include current
events, such as information contained in newspaper articles.
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lawyers should be aware in constructing appellate arguments, and suggests that lawyers may have an ethical obligation to include non-legal
information in support of certain policy arguments. Part II identifies
the primary types of cases in which courts are called upon to create
new rules of law. It discusses the importance of policy in these cases
and shows how non-legal information plays an important role in
courts' policy determinations. Part III addresses some of the concerns
raised when individuals trained as lawyers make use of materials created by non-legal disciplines they may not understand, such as the
social sciences. This final part also addresses lawyers' ethical obligations when making use of non-legal information, as well as the courts'
role in assessing information provided in the party briefs. The article
concludes by calling for further scholarship to explore the uses of
non-legal information in appellate briefs and to address more specifically how this material can be taught in our law schools.
I.

Reasons to Use Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs

As long as appellate courts decide cases and write opinions that
rely upon non-legal materials, lawyers should learn to use these materials effectively. There are no procedural bars to introducing factual
material at the appellate stage for purposes of determining what the
law should be. Often cases raising novel legal theories are disposed of
pre-trial, through dismissals or summary judgments, and do not have
fully developed factual records.28 Courts developing new legal rules
are clearly turning to non-legal information for support, often finding
it on their own if counsel does not provide it to them.29 Lawyers are
missing a golden opportunity for advocacy by allowing judges alone to
28. For example, cases requiring the recognition of a new cause of action are likely to
be rejected by the trial court for failing to state a cognizable claim. See, e.g, Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 960 (NJ. 1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment because, as matter of first impression, employee's claim of age discrimination based
on youth was cognizable); Blumenreich v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut Cas. Ins. Co., 722 A.2d
598 (N.J. Super. 1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment because, as a matter of first
impression, pollution clause in insurance policy did not include lead paint poisoning).
29. See, e.g., Swidler 8c Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding tfiat,
except in testamentary cases, the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client).
The Court, while noting that there is litde empirical evidence on the impact of a posthumous exception to the attorney-client privilege, cites three conflicting studies. See id. at 410
n.4. None of these studies was cited by Petitioner in its brief. See Brief for Petitioners,
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 5244J.S. 399 (1998) (No. 97-1192); Reply Brief for Petitioners, Swidler 8c Berlin v. United States of America, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (No. 97-1192).
The United States only cited the one study that supported its position. See Brief for United
States at 40, Swidler 8c Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (No. 97-1192) (citing
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989)).
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research non-legal materials and draw their own connections, often
unsupported, between the legal arguments presented and the factual
information thought to be supportive of the judge's conclusion. It is
particularly important for lawyers to do this when making policy arguments, for which non-legal information may often provide the best
support For all of these reasons, lawyers not only can, but should use
non-legal information in support of arguments in appellate briefs.
A. Nothing Prohibits the Introduction of Non-Legal Material at the
Appellate Stage
The most obvious reason that lawyers should make use of nonlegal materials in appellate briefs is that there is no good reason not
to. There are no procedural or evidentiary rules that prevent a lawyer
from citing factual information. Indeed, it has been done since the
early twentieth century, when Louis Brandeis submitted his brief in
Muller v. Oregon?0 Because the use of legislative facts is in no way prohibited, it should be considered a tool in a lawyer's arsenal which, like
all such tools, should be used to advocate a client's position when
appropriate.31
The court recognizes legislative facts through a device called "judicial notice." Judicial notice allows a judge to consider a fact that has
not passed through the hurdles presented by evidentiary rules and the
adversary process.32 Professor Davis first elaborated on the nature of
legislative facts in an article critiquing the Model Code of Evidence
provisions on judicial notice, prepared by the American Law Institute.33 He used the term "legislative facts" to distinguish them from
"adjudicative facts"—facts about "what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were,"34—in other
words, the facts that normally go to a jury in a trial.35
Professor Davis believed the Model Code was unsound because it
did not recognize any distinction between facts about the parties and
facts bearing on law and policy, and as a result, the judicial notice
30.

See Muller, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see also supra note 12.

31.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 a n t 1 (1999) (requiring a

lawyer to act "with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf).
32. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, 548-51.
33. See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 8, at 946. Professor Davis was addressing the
Uniform Rules of Evidence proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as well
as the Model Code. His critique of both was identical, and for ease of discussion the author
refers only to the Model Code.
34. Davis, An Approach, supra note 9, at 402.
35. See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 8, at 952.
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provisions were unduly restrictive.36 In particular, Professor Davis protested the limitation of judicial notice to facts that were indisputable
or found in sources of indisputable accuracy.37 Judges faced with making law and deciding policy must consider facts of a general, and
therefore often disputable, nature. It is both unrealistic and harmful
to the lawmaking process to limit the realm of facts available to judges
in deciding these cases.38
This view prevailed when Federal Rule of Evidence section 201
was enacted in 1975. 39 The advisory committee specifically notes that
u
[n]o rule deals with judicial notice of 'legislative' facts."40 Relying
heavily on Professor Davis's writings, the advisory committee believed
that judicial access to legislative facts should not be restricted by "any
limitation in the form of indisputability, any formal requirements of
notice other than those already inherent in affording opportunity to
hear and be heard and exchanging briefs, and any requirement of
formal findings at any level."41 Rather, the committee believed that
judicial use of legislative facts should be governed by judicial methods
of determining domestic law, in which
the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He
may reject the propositions of either party or of both parties. He
may consult the sources of pertinent data to which they refer, or he
may refuse to do so. He may make an independent search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or what the parties
present.42
Thus, the advisory committee made clear that they did not believe any
formal restraint on the judicial notice of legislative facts was
appropriate.
A number of scholars have criticized this complete lack of rules
regarding judicial reception of legislative facts, and have proposed a
variety of reforms. 43 Most of these scholars begin with the premise
that in determining a new rule of law, courts need u to be informed on
matters far beyond the facts of the particular case."44 Their concern is
36.

See id. at 946.

37.

See id. at 948 (citing MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 804 (2), (3)).

38.

See id. at 949.

39.

S ^ F E D . R.EVID. 201.

40. FED. R. EVID. 201 (a) advisory committee's note.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270
(1944)).
43. See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 8; Davis, supra note 17; Karst, supra note 17;
Miller &: Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the
Justices, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975); Monafaan 8c Walker, Social^uthority, supra note 20.
44. Karst, supra note 17, at 77.
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that when courts use legislative facts, "their legal enshrinement is casual and unselfconscious, and their assessment often superficial and
skewed by litigation imbalances. "45 These scholars also express concern that lawyers do not understand the importance of presenting legislative facts in support of proposed legal rules, and that judges rely on
their own assumptions, rather than looking for facts about the effects
of the legal rules they create. 46
In response to these problems, these scholars have proposed a
number of potential reforms. The simplest of the reforms focus on
educating lawyers and judges about the importance of legislative
facts.47 More formal proposals include encouraging judges to request
factual briefs from parties and amici, allowing parties to respond to
the legislative facts, appointing experts,48 and providing a framework
for the courts to assess the validity of empirical data.49 In addition,
some have suggested the trial is really the better forum, and that, if
necessary, courts should remand so that a more complete record is
developed.50 Professor Peggy Davis has suggested the adoption of
rules governing the admissibility of legislative facts.51 To date, none of
these suggestions has been formally adopted, leaving the use of legislative facts unrestricted.52
Thus, there is. no procedural bar to introducing non-legal material in support of appellate arguments, even when it has not been introduced in the trial court proceedings. This leaves advocates with the
45. Davis, supra note 17, at 1542; see also Karst, supra note 17, at 84-86; Monahan 8c
Walker, Social Authority, supra note 20, at 485.
46. See Davis, Facts, supra note 17, at 940; Davis, supra note 17, at 1600-02; Karst, supra
note 17, at 83-84; Miller &: Barron, supra note 43, at 1211, 1228.
47. See Karst, supra note 17, at 99; Miller 8c Barron, supra note 43, at 1242; see also
George R. Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice
and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 39, 53 (1960).
48. See Davis, Facts, supra note 17, at 940; Davis, supra note 17, at 1598-1600; Karst,
supra note 17, at 106-08. The authors suggest that an independent, court-appointed expert, or resident panel might provide better advice to the court than would expert testimony presented at trial.
49. See Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority, supra note 20, at 499-508.
50. See Davis, Facts, supra note 17, at 940; Karst, supra note 17, at 98; see also John
Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief—Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as a ForumforPresenting Legislative Facts, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC 1, 2 (1993).
51. See Davis, supra note 17, at 1600.
52. For speculations on the reasons for the continued resistance to formalizing the
judicial reception of legislative facts, see Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 121-25 (suggesting
that such an open embrace of the courts' legislative function would undermine its legitimacy); see also Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV.
I l l , 114-15 (1997) (asserting that courts' use of legislative fact is primarily rhetorical, and
therefore not conducive to regulation).
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obligation to use non-legal materials when they would help the client.
Appellate lawyers are expected to use all the tools at their disposal in
constructing an argument that best represents their clients' positions. 53 In constructing their arguments, lawyers should view non-legal
materials as one of those tools. There is no reason not to, and failing
to do so may violate the ethical obligation of zealous advocacy. 54
B.

Courts Will Use Non-Legal Materials Even if the Lawyers Do
Not Provide the Materials

Another pragmatic reason lawyers should be encouraged to cite
non-legal materials in briefs is that, whether or not they appear in the
briefs, judges are likely to seek out and rely on legislative facts when
formulating a new legal rule of general application. Lawyers should
not opt out of this important part of the decision-making process. In
the same way that a lawyer should want to present a relevant case in a
brief, so that the court understands the lawyer's "take" on it and how
it fits into the theory of the case, a lawyer should want to present relevant non-legal material for the same purpose.
Kenneth Karst asserted that when faced with rendering decisions
which require knowledge of legislative facts, courts most often either
assume the answer or conduct their own research to ascertain these
facts. 55 Anecdotal evidence and empirical research seem to bear this
o u t Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice George Currie documented
many instances in which the appellate court sought out and took judicial notice of legislative facts, whether or not the parties provided
them. 5 6 In his extensive study of appellate court decision-making,
Thomas Marvell found that only a quarter of the social facts cited in
53.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt 1 (1999) (requiring a

lawyer to act "with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf*); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt 1 (1999) ("The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure
for the fullest benefit of the client's cause.... The law, both procedural and substantive,
establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed.").
54. The suggestion that lawyers have an ethical obligation to use non-legal materials
raises a host of other questions: Can failure to cite relevant non-legal material expose counsel to liability for malpractice? Does opposing counsel have an obligation to point out the
invalidity of cited material? Is there then an obligation under Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.3(3) to disclose adverse information? Answering these questions is beyond the
scope of this piece, but will be addressed in a future article.
55. See Karst, supra note 17, at 84, 95; see also Jackson, supra note 50, at 5 *[I]f given
few setded facts, appellate courts will either build doctrines out of thin air or find other
facts to support their conclusions, and this process is often completed without the benefit
of the input or knowledge of the parties/ id.
56. See Currie, supra note 47, at 44-49.
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opinions had been provided by counsel.57 This suggests that in the
remaining seventy-five percent of the time, judges seek out this information on their own and lawyers are left out of an important part of
the decision-making process.58 All of these scholars agree that the system would be better served if lawyers took a more prominent role in
addressing the use of legislative facts in a given case.59
Recent studies show there has been a marked increase in courts'
citation to non-legal material in support of their opinions.60 Concerns
about how courts use, or misuse this information have been voiced as
the use of the information has increased.61 Professor David Faigman,
reviewing the United States Supreme Court's use of empirical research in its constitutional decision-making, found that the Court's
use of this information was inconsistent—using it accurately, misconstruing it, dismissing it altogether, or reasoning around it, depending
on the case.62 Many legal scholars have commented that judges only
use empirical evidence when that evidence supports the decision that
57. See MARVELL, supra note 13, at 174. Marvell's study included a number of state
supreme courts and federal circuit courts. In addition to reviewing opinions, briefs, and
oral arguments, Marvell conducted interviews of judges, law clerks, and appellate lawyers.
See id. at 6.
58. Amicus briefs are also a common method by which modern courts are provided
with non-legal information relevant to the creation of a new legal rule. See Rustad &: Koenig, supra note 22, at 94. The use of amicus briefs for this purpose is the subject of much
interesting and contentious discussion, in which the author does not intend to engage.
The sole focus of this article is the use of non-legal information in party briefs to support
policy arguments made in the context of a full legal argument
59. See Currie, supra note 47 at 53; Jackson, supra note 50, at 5; Karst, supra note 17, at
95; MARVELL, supra note 13, at 176.
60. See Schauer 8c Wise, supra note 11, at 1108. The authors counted citations to nonlegal materials in United States Supreme Court opinions for the 1950, 1960, 1970, 1975,
1980,1985, 1990,1991,1992,1993,1994, and 1995 Terms. The analysis showed a substantial increase in citation of non-legal sources starting in 1991. Their research also showed
similar increases in other appellate courts. The study counted citations to "history, political
science, economics, and other non-legal academic journals, to newspapers and popular
periodicals, to dictionaries and encyclopedias, to books of history, politics, and the like,
and occasionally to poetry, plays, and literature." Id at n.92.
61. Several scholars have expressed concern over a court's ability to accurately assess
empirical research from other disciplines. See, e.g., Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority,
supra note 20, at 499 (providing a specific set of criteria for courts to use in evaluating
scientific research); Rustad 8c Koenig, supra note 22, at 99, 158-60 (calling for court-appointed experts or other mechanisms to aid courts in assessing information).
62. See Faigman, supra note 17, at 548-50. Faigman posits that the reason for this
inconsistency is the tension between "objective" empirical evidence, and the normative
principles, which typically drive constitutional decision-making. He ultimately concludes
that, in spite of the difficulties, facts play an important role in guiding the Court's constitutional decision-making. See id at 550.
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the judge already favors on other grounds.63 While there are many
legitimate questions about courts' use of non-legal materials, they do
not negate the fact that courts are using, and will continue to use nonlegal information in support of decisions.
Consideration of how courts use non-legal information and what
this means for jurisprudence is an important endeavor.64 Lawyers
should not stand aside, however, waiting for scholars and lawmakers
to resolve the issues and come up with a systematized use of non-legal
information, if that is even possible or desirable.65 If anything, current
information about the judicial use of non-legal material should impel
lawyers to take a more active role. Uncertainty in an area of jurisprudence leaves room for advocacy, and there is plenty of room for advocacy with the use of non-legal information to support policy
arguments.
If a judge is going to make an assumption based on his or her
own personal knowledge, information supplied in a brief may reinforce that assumption, or may help counteract an unthinking assumption. If a judge conducts independent research, the attorney runs the
risk that the judge might not look for sources the attorney might consider relevant and consistent with his theory of the case. Although
non-legal information will rarely prove dispositive of a case, it may well
provide a restraining influence.66 A court is unlikely to make a decision that flies directly in the face of substantial empirical research or
63. See, e.g., Constance Lindman, Note, Sources of Judicial Distrust of Social Science Evidence: A Comparison of Social Science and Jurisprudence, 64 IND. L. J. 755, 756 (1989) (quoting
Kerr, Social Science and the U.S. Supreme Court, in THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 56, 64-65 (M. Kaplan e& 1986)); Donald N. Bersoff Be David J. Glass,
The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. Cm.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 293 (1995).

64. Indeed, the bulk of the scholarship on courts' use of non-legal material falls into
this category. See supra notes 17-22.
65. Whether use of non-legal materials should be more carefully regulated depends,
in large part, on the view one takes of how these materials should be used by the courts.
This in itself is a subject of great debate. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 17, at 543-44 (suggesting that legislative facts serve an interpretive function in constitutional lawmaking);
Hashimoto, supra note 52, at 114-15 (suggesting that legislative facts serve a rhetorical
function); Radial N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts injudicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988) (suggesting that legislative facts serve an
evidentiary function in lawmaking); Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 121 (formalizing the
process for judicial reception of legislative facts will increase the hegemony of pragmatic
balancing at the expense of other processes of judicial reasoning.").
66. See Faigman, supra note 17, at 548-49. Faigman's article focuses on the use of
empirical information in constitutional cases. See id. His reasoning could easily be applied
to the use of non-legal information in any case which requires the court to make new law.
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established social theories. 67 Consistent misuse of non-legal information can serve to undermine a court's legitimacy, the court may appear irrational, and its decisions may be considered unpersuasive.68 At
a minimum, providing non-legal material in a brief allows an attorney
to try and impose that restraining influence.
An appellate attorney would be considered remiss in failing to
discuss a case, or other source of legal authority, which, though not
directly binding on the court, has a clear potential to influence the
court's reasoning. 69 Even if the attorney knows the court is aware of
the case, the attorney should discuss how the case fits into the particular argument and overall theory of the appeal.70 Attorneys should
think of using non-legal information in much the same way. Even if
the court seeks out the information itself, or is provided information
through an amicus brief, the lawyer should still want to explain how
non-legal sources inform the policy in support of the lawyer's
argument.
In many ways, the descriptions of courts' use of non-legal information sound much like descriptions of a court's use of legal authority which is not directly binding on the outcome of the case.71
Professor Faigman places the Supreme Court's use of empirical evidence in four categories: (1) the Court conforms its findings to the
available factual information; (2) the Court claims to follow the research, but misapplies the findings in framing its conclusions; (3) the
Court advances its own conception of the issue, misunderstanding or
finding the factual information inconclusive; and (4) the Court dismisses the importance of a particular fact for its conclusion and relies
on some alternate ground or authority.72 In the same way, courts' use
67. See id. at 604-05.
68. See id. at 604.
69. See STERN ET AL., supra note 24, at 318-19; see also Canel 8c Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 710
N.E.2d 861, 869 (111. App. CL 1999) (finding that failure to cite cases from other states on
issues of first impression did not preclude court's consideration of issues, but suggesting
that such citation would have been useful).
70. See STERN ET AL., supra note 24, at 317 (indicating the need for a lawyer to go
beyond case citation and provide an explanation of how case supports argument); see also
IRVING YOUNGER, PERSUASIVE WRITING 56 (1990) (pointing out that a citation without explanation will not be persuasive if the judge sees the case differently than the attorney).
71. I am not here suggesting that legislative facts should be formally treated as authority, although some scholars have suggested that See Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority,
supra note 20, at 478 (providing an in-depth discussion of the ways in which social science
research "is more analogous to law than to fact"). I am merely outlining some of the parallels in order to suggest that lawyers should view the use of non-legal information as similar
to that of non-binding legal authority for the purposes of making policy arguments.
72. See Faigman, supra note 17, at 550.
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of persuasive authority can be inconsistent and result-oriented.73 In
evaluating persuasive authority, a court may follow it in developing a
new rule, claim to follow persuasive authority, but misapply the reasoning of the authority, advance its own conception of an issue, avoiding persuasive authority, or finding it irrelevant, distinguish the
reasoning of persuasive authority and rely instead on other grounds.74
Ultimately, a lawyer has no control over how the court will make
use of persuasive authority, but this does not mean that the lawyer
should not try to make use of such authority, and to place it in the
brief in the context of the lawyer's theory of the case, using the authority as a tool of advocacy in advancing a client's position.75 In the
same manner, the lawyer should use potentially persuasive non-legal
authority to support arguments in the brief, regardless of whether the
court will obtain the information independently, and regardless of
whether the court will rely on the information in the way that the
lawyer suggests. Of course, the lawyer should have an understanding
of how the court will, or is likely to use non-legal information, in the
same way that a lawyer should always try and assess a court's judicial
temperament and approach to legal authority.76 This may or may not
be possible but, regardless, as long as courts are using non-legal material to support the creation of new legal rules, lawyers should take an
active role in presenting that material to the court
C.

Non-Legal Materials Are Often the Best Support for
Policy-Based Arguments

In addition to the pragmatic reasons discussed above for including non-legal materials in appellate briefs, there is a more substantive
reason. In cases which require the formulation of a new legal rule,
policy-based reasoning is extremely important,77 and the appellate
73. See STERN ET AL., supra note 24, at 316 ("supreme courts . . . have great adeptness
in distinguishing, avoiding, or even ignoring cases which might lead to conclusions they
deem unfair or unwise").
74. See Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1011, 1013 (1990) (pointing out that courts "are capable of being careless and casual with
legal authority as well as with other kinds of authority").
75. See STERN ET AL., supra note 24, at 317. Stern points out that even if the meaning of
a case (or other source of authority) seems self-evident, the lawyer should always provide
the court with an explanation of how the authority supports the conclusion she wants the
court to adopt. See id.
76.

See GIRVAN PECK, WRITING PERSUASIVE BRIEFS 75-78 (1984).

77. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 72 (To address novel questions of law, judges must
turn to "public policy, the good of the collective body."). Cardozo's view has firmly taken
root in modern jurisprudence. See also Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Brennan Legacy: The Art of
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lawyer should present policy arguments as effectively as possible to the
court.78 Non-legal materials can often be the best, and sometimes the
only support for these policy arguments. Indeed, non-legal materials
serve a unique function in supporting policy arguments that is different from other uses of legislative facts. Because of this, the appellate
court is the appropriate forum to use them. In order the fully explain
this, this section first explores the nature of policy arguments in appellate briefs, then defines the term "legislative facts" more precisely, and
finally reviews the particular use of non-legal material in support of
policy arguments, as distinguished from other uses.
Policy-based reasoning involves an assessment of whether a proposed legal rule will benefit society, or advance a particular social
goal.79 In making this determination, courts are required to identify a
desirable result, and then consider whether the operation of the proposed rule will encourage that result, as well as discourage undesirable results.80 Because a new rule will likely be of general applicability,
courts must consider how a proposed rule will work for future litigants, as well as for society as a whole.81 Assessing the general effect a
legal rule will have is, by definition, a future-oriented enterprise.
A policy argument, then, is an attempt to persuade a court to
adopt a rule for reasons of public policy—an argument formulated
around the elements of policy-based reasoning.82 In constructing this
argument, a lawyer would first try to convince the court that the goal
she advocates is a desirable one, both for her client and for society as a
whole, and then show the court how the proposed rule would serve to
achieve that goal.83 This, again, is a future-oriented argument about
Judging, 32 LOY. LA. L. REV. 673, 677 (1999) (The basis of modern jurisprudence is that
"Ijludges should consider the effect of their judicial decisions on society and social welfare, rather than adhering solely to a mechanical jurisprudence of legal conceptions.").
78. I am not suggesting, however, that policy-based reasoning is the only reasoning
process judges employ when engaged in rule making. Even when the court is assuming a
legislative function, judges and lawyers still view the court as an adjudicative body in which
"text, precedent, and principle still play a significant role." Woolhandler, supra note 17, at
116. See also Hashimoto, supra note 52, at 130-31. Most judicial decisions are a product of a
variety of forms of reasoning (rule-based, normative, etc.) woven together. See EDWARDS,
supra note 25, at 4-8. While policy arguments can be very important and useful, conventional legal arguments still have the greatest impact See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The
Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 41-42 (1998).
79. See EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 10.
SO. See id
81. See id.
82. See FECK, supra note 76, at 78-81.
83. See Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 114.
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the effect a legal rule will have, presented to encourage the legal decision-maker to adopt that rule.84
The type of policy argument described above differs somewhat
from the type of policy arguments typically taught in law school, and
typically exercised by practicing attorneys. The more common policy
argument involves identifying the underlying policy of an existing rule
and showing how that policy applies to a client's situation.85 The underlying policy of a statute is generally gleaned from legislative history,
and the underlying policy of a case is generally gleaned from the
court's reasoning (including possible references to legislative facts).86
It is not siuprising that this is the more common understanding of
policy arguments, since it is much more likely that a lawyer will be
advocating the application of an existing rule than proposing that the
court adopt a new rule.87
These two types of policy arguments are really just opposite sides
of the same coin. In the second, more common type of policy analysis,
lawyers and judges are merely making use of the policy underlying a
rule previously adopted by the court. In adopting that rule in the first
place, however, the court must, at some point, have engaged in the
first type of policy-based reasoning. Thus, while lawyers are typically
taught to ascertain a court's policy-based reasoning and apply it to a
new situation, they are not typically taught how to construct that analysis when it cannot be found in a source of legal authority. Even
though cases necessitating this form of argument are rare, when a
case requiring the adoption of a new legal rule does arise, a lawyer
should be prepared to argue it effectively.

84. See id.
85. Most of the legal writing textbooks cover this type of policy argument See, e.g.,
EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 107; NEUMANN, JR., supra note 25, at 131; PRATT, supra note 25,
at 325; SHAPO ET. AL., supra note 25, at 44. The distinction drawn here between legal issues
involving previously expressed policy and novel issues with no direct source of policy is
somewhat artificial. Cases raising issues in which there are no relevant rules and sources of
policy will be extremely rare. I make this distinction largely for the purpose of focusing the
discussion.
86. See PRATT, supra note 25, at 321-24.
87. See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 8, at 952 "In the great mass of cases decided by
courts and by agencies, the legislative element is either absent, unimportant, or interstitial,
because in most cases the applicable law and policy have been previously establishedn Id. S
ee also CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 164. Most cases fell into two categories, those in which the
"law and its application alike are plain," and those in which the "rule of law is certain and
the application alone doubtful." Id. This leaves only a small number in which the court
must develop a new rule. See id.
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A good policy argument, like any good argument presented in a
brief, should be well-supported by authority.88 Traditional sources of
authority may not provide adequate support for policy, however. The
lawyer crafting a policy argument must be aware of the sources the
court considers in developing a new legal rule. In determining desirable social policy, the court may go beyond common law and statutory
sources and rely on other disciplines such as sociology, economics,
and political science.89 Professor Edwards identifies several components of policy-based reasoning: "aesthetic principles, scientific models, social organization, economic analysis, efficiency concerns,
political realities and predictable psychological reactions."90 All of
these components require reliance on non-legal, factual information—legislative fact
Indeed, one definition of "legislative fact" echoes closely the definition of a policy argument: ttA paradigmatic legislative fact is one that
shows the general effect a legal rule will have, and is presented to
encourage the decisionmaker to make a particular legal rule."91 Policy
arguments are predictions of the effect a legal rule will have, and factual information provides the basis for that prediction. For example,
in a case in which the court is asked to impose tort liability on a
mother for injury to a child caused by the mother's negligent conduct
during pregnancy,92 the mother may argue that a duty to a fetus
would be unduly intrusive because it would affect every moment of a
woman's life, even before pregnancy (the policy argument). As support, she may provide medical information (legislative fact) about the
many ways a woman's conduct before and during pregnancy, such as
diet, physical activity and choice of work, could affect the health of a
fetus.93 If medical information supports the contention that the
mother's health even before pregnancy can affect the health of the
88. See ALDISERT, supra note 25, at 206-07 ("[Qommon law tradition demands authority to support propositions asserted in the brief.**).
89. See EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 25 (citing CARDOZO, supra note 1).
90. EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 25.
91. Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 114 (citations omitted); see also Karst, supra note
17, at 81 (discussing the need forjudges to have information about the probable effects of
their decisions). Although this may be the quintessential definition of legislative fact, the
term is used more broadly, to encompass other uses of non-legal materials. See infra notes
103-28 and accompanying text
92. See Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App. 1999) (affirming summary
judgment for mother where child's conservator sued mother for damages caused to child
by mother's drug use during pregnancy).
93. See id. at 477. Chenault provides the perfect example of why this information would
have to be provided at the appellate level in a brief. The plaintiffs claim was dismissed by
summary judgment, so no factual record was developed. See id. at 475. For the mother to
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fetus, the policy argument will be much more persuasive than the
same assertion without any factual support 94
A prediction about the future operation of a rule, if there is any
support at all, is of necessity a prediction based in fact. A legal rule
cannot answer questions such as: How will this rule promote the
health or safety of a community? How will this interpretation of a statute serve to eliminate the problem the statute is designed to address?
How much will individual liberties be restricted if this statute is found
to be constitutional? All of these are questions of fact 95 For this reason, non-legal information is the best, and often the only, support for
a policy argument. Indeed, this suggests that if a lawyer cannot find a
factual basis to support an asserted policy argument in a brief, she
should rethink the persuasive value of the argument.
It is also the predictive nature of the policy argument that makes
the appellate brief the appropriate medium in which to cite non-legal
material. The purpose of the policy argument is to persuade the court
to adopt (or refuse to adopt) a new legal rule, and facts are used to
help the court determine the content of the law. Because it will be the
appellate court, not the trial court, that ultimately makes the decision
about the content of the law,96 it is not only appropriate, but logical,
to introduce non-legal material in support of policy arguments at the
appellate stage.
Ultimately, of course, factual information alone cannot provide
the answer to what legal rule should be adopted. Because policy arguments are predictions, they are, by their nature, disputable.97 In addition, non-legal materials do not provide the answer to the first step in
a policy analysis—the identification of a desirable goal.98 Facts alone
cannot dictate which effects are desirable, or whether one effect outbase a policy argument on medical infonnation, such information would have to be provided to the court of appeals.
94. In Chenault, die court found just diis type of infonnation highly persuasive. See id.
at 476-77. Based on die information before it, die court found diat to develop a workable
standard of care would require such an extensive analysis of scientific and medical data
that the legislature, rather man the court should address the issue. See id. at 478.
95. See Karst, supra note 17, at 84. If a judge doesn't receive factual information to
answer such questions, "he assumes the answers based on his own experience and education." Id.
96. See Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority, supra note 20, at 496-97 (suggesting that,
if social information is viewed as audiority rather dian fact, die brief is die most appropriate forum for presenting it to the court).
97. See Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 123.
98. See id.
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weighs another one." Determining the desirable goal is a normative
judgment, not a factual one. 100 In the end, a court adopting a new
legal rule will have to rely on moral and legal principles.101 Non-legal
materials can help appellate judges be better informed about the implications of those principles, but they cannot replace them.
Used in this way, as support for policy arguments, non-legal
materials are a small subset of legislative facts as they are contemplated by the scholars. Many of the calls for greater regulation of legislative facts102 are based on different assumptions of the role legislative
facts play injudicial lawmaking. While many of the scholars recognize
that legislative facts are used in multiple ways,103 they rarely suggest
that legislative facts should be treated differently because of their use.
One common use of legislative facts is to provide a background
against which to measure the adjudicative facts of a case.104 For example, in a case involving an individual with post-traumatic stress syndrome, a court might consider psychological data about the syndrome
in order to assess the person's actions.105 In one study, Peggy Davis
found that courts commonly use psychological parent theory106 as
background information in child custody cases.107 In some of these
cases, the courts took judicial notice of the theory without any presentation of expert testimony or challenge from the parties.108 Used in
99. See id.
100. See Hashimoto, supra note 52, at 130.
101. See id. at 130-31.
102. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text
103. See, e.g.t Davis, Facts, supra note 17, at 932 (describing six different scales on which
legislative facts can foil); Davis, supra note 17, at 1547 (identifying four different ways the
psychological parent theory was used by courts); Faigman, supra note 17, at 553 (dividing
legislative facts into two categories for purposes of constitutional decision-making).
104. See Walker 8c Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 20t at 559 (suting that "general research results are used to construct a frame of reference or background context for
deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case").
105. See, e.g., Roling v. Daily, 596 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 1999) (allowing general evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder in order to assess emotional damages to plaintiff in
car accident).
106. Simplified greatly, this theory suggests that psychological bonds should play a
greater role than biological ties in determining a child's best interest See Davis, supra note
17, at 1542-45 (citations omitted).
107. See id. at 1549.
108. See id. Peggy Davis suggests that this use of psychological theory, which is informal
and occasionally unconscious, is inappropriate, and that the use of the theory at trial
should be more regularized. See id While Davis raises valid concerns, this use of non-legal
material is very different from the use of such material in support of policy arguments
outlined above.
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this way, the non-legal information seems to perform an adjudicative
function, but is still considered to be legislative fact.109
Walker and Monahan suggest that social science used for the purpose of setting a background context for understanding adjudicative
facts should really be separated into a third category of fact, called
"social framework."110 They propose a series of procedures to improve
the use of social framework evidence in trials.111 Whether called social
framework or legislative fact, it is clear that non-legal information introduced for the purpose of assessing adjudicative facts should be
presented to the trial court, and not on appeal. Social science used in
this way does not, or at least not directly,112 influence the court's selection of a rule of law. Instead, social framework evidence influences a
judge or jury's view of the facts. The use of legislative facts for this
purpose is very different than their use to support policy arguments,
oudined above. This different use suggests that context should govern
the way courts and lawyers make use of non-legal information.113
Another use of legislative fact occurs primarily in constitutional
adjudication. The court (usually the United States Supreme Court)
uses legislative facts under a particular constitutional provision in order to determine the constitutionality of a state's action. The original
Brandeis brief falls into this category. In MuUer,114 the Court was asked
to determine the constitutionality of an Oregon statute limiting the
number of hours per day women could work.115 In his brief on behalf
of the state, Brandeis presented extensive social science research to
demonstrate that the state had a rational basis for restricting women's
work hours for the sake of public safety, health, morals, or welfare.116
This is probably the most common conception of the use of legislative
facts.117 In Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to state action, the court commonly reviews or speculates on the reasons for the
109. See id. at 1548 (citations omitted).
110. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 20, at 560, 569-570 (studies introduced as background incorporate elements of both adjudicative and legislative fact, and
should be thought of as a separate category).
111. See id. at 583-98 (ranging from how the information should be presented to the
court, to how the jury should be instructed).
112. See Davis, supra note 17, at 1562.
113. See Saks, supra note 74, at 1018-26, 1030-31 (identifying three categories of uses
for non-legal materials and suggesting that they should be treated differendy by courts,
according to their function).
114. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
115. See id. at 416-17.
116. See id. at 416 (quoting an abstract from Brandeis* brief).
117. See Faigman, supra note 17, at 553.
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state's action. This type of review is different than the future-oriented
policy analysis discussed above. In these cases, the state has already
identified a desired goal and taken action to achieve that goal. The
court must look back to determine whether the goal is valid, and
whether the method the state chose to achieve the goal is appropriate.
Professor David Faigman, another scholar who has proposed further
subdivision of legislative fact, calls facts used for this purpose "constitutional review" facts.118
This use of legislative facts is an outgrowth of the pragmatic balancing advocated by the Legal Realist movement of the early twentieth century.119 Use of the balancing test in constitutional adjudication
"has become widespread, if not dominant, over the last four decades."120 It is this view of lawmaking which scholars like Professor
Kenneth Karst have when they suggest that legislative facts would better serve the process by being introduced at the trial level.121 Karst
posits that the Supreme Court cannot do a proper job of balancing
when faced with an inadequate record of legislative facts, and that
development of these facts at trial would optimize the Court's ability
to balance interests.122
The rationale behind suggestions that trial courts are the better
forum for introducing legislative facts is that when the record is established at trial, fact-finding can be more controlled, the parties will
have a more active role, the facts will be tested, and judges will be less
118. Id. Faigman divides legislative facts into two categories: "constitutional-rule" facts
and "constitutional-review* facts. Constitutional-rule facts are an interpretive device, along
with other sources of authority such as text, original intent and precedent, to aid in establishing the meaning of the Constitution. Constitutional-review facts provide the Court with
information against which to measure a state's action. Although Faigman*s analysis is limited to the use of legislative facts in constitutional adjudication, this subdivision of legislative facts could apply more broadly to other kinds of cases.
119. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 955-60 (1987).
120. Id. at 943-44. Professor Aleinikoff defines a decision in which the Court employs
constitutional balancing as "a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional question by
identifying interests implicated by the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule of
constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests." Id.
at 945.
121. See Karst, supra note 17, at 81; see also Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 116-17 (suggesting that scholars who propose greater regulation of legislative facts elevate pragmatic
balancing at the expense of other forms of legal decision-making).
122. See Karst, supra note 17, at 95, 100-03 (discussing the inadequacy of Brandeis
briefs and expressing a preference for expert testimony at trial); see alsoJackson, supra note
50, at 2-3 (arguing that the trial court is the superior forum in which to present legislative
evidence).

218

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

likely to seek out information on their own.123 Given a setded trial
record, appellate judges will be obligated to deal with the facts more
direcdy than if the facts were presented in a brief.124 Providing information through a brief is a second-best solution, to be employed primarily by appellate lawyers stuck with an inadequate trial record.125
While it may often be advantageous to establish legislative facts as
part of the trial record, particularly when the court is engaged in reviewing the legitimacy of a state's action, there are flaws in this logic.
First, this view assumes that courts place pragmatic balancing over
other forms of legal reasoning, and that with the full factual record
before it, a court will find the "right" decision inevitable.126 This is not
the case, as courts continue to use a variety of methods for decisionmaking.127 Second, the scholars who promote fuller records at trial
suggest that appellate courts will be obligated to give deference to the
lower court's finding of fact, and thus be forced to consider the legislative facts more fully. Studies of appellate courts' use of legislative
facts do not support this conclusion.128 Thus, while development of
legislative facts at trial may create a more complete record, and allow
for more testing of the validity of the evidence, there is no guarantee
that the appellate court will be more influenced by facts in the trial
record than by facts in the brief.
Of the multiple uses of legislative facts, using them as support for
policy arguments is least problematic at the appellate level. The appellate court facing a novel issue of law is more likely to turn to policy to
inform its decision, and non-legal materials are a natural source to
support policy arguments. In addition, non-legal information can
serve a rhetorical function, establishing legitimacy for new legal rules
by relying on modern society's trust in scientific findings.129 The brief123. SeeJackson, supra note 50, at 3,41. Jackson came to this conclusion after reviewing
several cases in which legislative facts were established extensively at trial. Among the cases
he reviewed were Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), and United States v. Virginia
(VMI), 976 F.2d 890 (4th Or. 1992).
124. See Jackson, supra note 50, at 5.
125. See id. at 41; see also STERN ET AI~, supra note 24, at 279 ("I suspect that the Brandeis
brief technique is often employed by lawyers newly brought in on appeal, after it is too late
to introduce the facts into the trial court record.").
126. See Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 116-18.
127. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text
128. See Faigman, supra note 17, at 550. Indeed, in both of the cases Jackson reviews,
discussed supra note 50, the appellate courts reversed the decisions of the trial courts, even
though those decisions were primarily based in the findings of legislative fact See Jackson,
supra note 50, at 16-18, 25.
129. See Hashimoto, supra note 52, at 115-16 (suggesting that the Supreme Court's use
of scientific information is primarily rhetorical, rather than evidentiary or interpretive).
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writer's job is to employ rhetoric—the tools of persuasion—in order
to persuade the court of a particular outcome.130 If non-legal materials assist in this endeavor, lawyers should employ them.
Some might balk at this instrumentalist view of the use of nonlegal materials. It is important to remember, however, that the lawyer's job is to be an advocate, within the bounds of professional ethics.131 It is the court's job to account for any disparity between party
resources, to assure that relevant legislative facts are adequately developed, and to ascertain the accuracy of non-legal materials contained
in the briefs.132 As previously stated, much of the legal scholarship on
legislative facts focuses on the role of the court 133 Lawyers should be
educated about the multiple uses of non-legal materials and use them
accordingly. In terms of the use of non-legal materials to support policy arguments, lawyers should be more alert to the types of cases in
which these arguments can play a pivotal role. An increased awareness, along with an understanding of how to introduce these materials, will improve the quality and persuasiveness of appellate briefs.
H.

Types of Cases in Which Policy Is Most Important

While policy can play a role in almost any case, it is particularly
important in cases which require a court to resolve a novel issue and
develop a new rule of law. These cases fall into three main categories—common law cases of first impression, constitutional cases raising novel applications of constitutional provisions, and cases requiring
statutory interpretation. A key reason for the importance of policy,
even in cases requiring the application of positive law (i.e., statutes
and constitutions), is the ubiquity of the common law method in
American legal decision-making.134 Courts employing the common
130. See ALDISERT, supra note 25, at 17; see also Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85 (1994) (applying classical rhetoric theory to the presentation
of a legal argument).
131.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmL 1 (1999) (requiring a

lawyer to act "with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalT); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt 1 (1999) (The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure
for the fullest benefit of the client's cause. . . . The law, both procedural and substantive,
establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed.").
132. See Davis, Facts, supra note 17, at 940.
133. See supra notes 17-22.
134. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 26-33 (the common law method pervades the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution and statutes); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding
Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (the Supreme Court's
methodology in interpreting statutes "bears significant traces of the common law form");
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law method turn to sources other than constitutions, statutes, and case
precedent to decide novel legal issues. A brief overview of common
law decision-making is therefore in order, before explaining its operation in each of the three categories.
The common law tradition, in which issues are resolved on a caseby-case basis, is premised on the understanding that law evolves over
time, rather than being derived from an authoritative source, such as
a statute or constitution.135 "The common law does not work from
pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is inductive, and it
draws its generalizations from particulars.''136 As new cases arise,
courts reason by analogy to previous cases, building on precedent to
develop a body of rules that govern the cases before them as well as
guiding future conduct.137 This system creates stability, while allowing
flexibility as society changes and new issues arise. Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the leading account of the common law method,
claimed that the genius of the common law is its ability to adapt doctrine to changes in social circumstance.138
Using the common law method, a court faced with a case must
first decide whether an existing rule (precedent) can be applied to
the factual situation before it 139 Occasionally, before a rule can be
applied, it needs to be reformulated—modified in some way to apply
to new circumstances.140 In a smaller, but significant portion of cases,
no clear rule applies, and there is a gap in the law that must be filled
in order to resolve the case.141 It is in filling these gaps that the common law judge assumes the role of the legislator and creates law.142
While judges can turn to existing legal principle to fill the gap, a [t]he
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L REV. 225, 239 (1999) (uAt the
state level, the common law largely continues to provide theframeworkwithin which statutory work is done.") (citations omitted). For a comprehensive overview of the common law
method, see RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD (1997).

135. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 879 (1996) (asserting that the primary model for understanding constitutional interpretation is the common law approach).
136. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 22-23.
137. See id, at 19-21.
138.

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (Litde Brown 8c Co.

1990) (1881).
139. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 19.
140. See id. at 23-28.
141. See id. at 69, 165-66.
142. See id

Winter 2000]

NON-LEGAL MATERIALS IN APPELLATE BRIEFS

221

prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed." 143 T h e common law method, then, allows the
courts to resort to sources other than text to resolve novel issues of
law.
Judges employing the common law method most obviously and
legitimately make law and policy. 144 Gaps also arise in constitutional
and statutory cases, when general language does not obviously apply
to particular situations. 145 Courts applying the common law method
in these cases may also turn to sources other than text. It is in performing their legislative role that courts most often turn to policy. For
this reason, when courts employ the common law method to decide
novel issues of law, policy plays a particularly important role.
A.

Common Law Cases of First Impression

Cases raising novel issues which no court in the jurisdiction (and
perhaps the nation) has addressed, and which no statute or constitutional provision governs, present the clearest case for die importance
of policy arguments. When statutes and case law fail to address a novel
issue, common law courts can fashion a common law solution, creating law where none existed. 146 In pure cases of first impression, courts
are not constrained by precedent—they do not have to decide
whether they can justify overruling, modifying, or extending an existing rule. Cases of first impression illustrate a gap in the legal landscape, which is much larger than a gap created by an ambiguous
statute or general constitutional provision 147 —a gap which the courts
must fill.
Cardozo suggested that, of all the available methods for filling
the gap, such as tradition, logic, and consistency,148 the overriding
method should be the "method of sociology," which places its emphasis on the social welfare. 149 Social welfare is described as "public pol143. HOLMES, supra note 138, at 1. Modern lawyers should be wary of relying on judges'
intuitions about public policy and instead take a more active role in providing the court
with concrete policy arguments about the effects of the proposed rule, or "gap-filler." See
supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text
144. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 20-21; HOLMES, supra note 138, at 35; ROSCOE
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 116 (1921).

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 69-71.
See Dorf, supra note 78, at 32.
See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 71.
See id. ?x lb.
See id. at 75-76.
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icy, the good of the collective body," which could be "expediency or
prudence," or could mean "the social gain that is wrought by adherence to the standards of right conduct, which find expression in the
mores of the community."150 In other words, "the final cause of law is
the welfare of society,"151 and in fashioning new rules, the court must
place the public good above all other considerations.152
The view that when the court is not constrained by precedent or
statute it should turn to public policy and social welfare in developing
new rules of law has firmly taken root in modern jurisprudence. 153
Judith S. Raye, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, confirms that today's state court judges, in filling the gaps, "are frequendy
left to choose among competing policies."154 Thus, in common law
cases of first impression, policy can play a crucial role in influencing a
court's decision. Attorneys making policy arguments must make them
effectively, which means supporting those arguments with non-legal
materials where appropriate.
Because there is virtually no federal common law,155 common law
cases of first impression will appear primarily in the state courts.156
Common law still plays an important role in state courts, even though
modern law is governed primarily by statutes, at both the federal and
state level.157 A key area in which state courts are faced with common
150. M a t 71-72.
151. M a t 66.
152. See id. 2Lt 67.
153. See ALDISERT, supra note 25, at 677. There are, of course, many constraints on a
court's ability to make policy under the common law. Since courts do not render advisory
opinions, they are limited to resolving only die dispute immediately before them. Appellate courts adhere faithfully to precedent when it exists, and decisions require the consensus of several judges. These factors all operate to maintain stability and prevent the court
from acting like a true legislature. &s Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New
Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1995).
154. Kaye, supra note 153, at 10.
155. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-42 (1981).
[A]bsent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned
with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international
disputes implicating die conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign
nations, and admiralty cases.
156. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 6 ("Even in today's legal landscape, dominated by
statutes, the common-law process remains the core element in state court
decisionmaking.").
157.

See Guroo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) ("In [the

last 50 to 80 years] we have gone from a legal system dominated by die common l a w . . . to
one in which statutes . . . have become die primary source of law.").
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law cases of first impression is establishing tort liability.158 State courts
are frequendy called upon to balance policy considerations in determining whether to establish new causes of action.159 Recendy, state
appellate courts have been asked, as issues of first impression: whether
a husband states a cause of action for emotional distress against his
wife's paramour;160 whether comparative negligence applies to a client's claim of legal malpractice;161 whether a custodial passenger in a
motor vehicle may be held liable for damages resulting from injuries
suffered by the infant plaintiff;162 and whether plaintiffs in an asbestos
case were entided to a presumption that, if they had been given an
adequate warning about the product, they would have followed it.163
State courts also shape the common law by refusing to recognize new
torts.164 In all of these cases, policy plays an important role.
Common law also plays a role in important "gateway" issues such
as standing, choice of law, and admissibility of evidence at common
law.165 These cases "are decided every day by state courts as a matter of
pure policy."166 For example, a Pennsylvania appellate court recendy
decided as a matter of first impression that a former same-sex domestic partner had standing to seek visitation of the child born to her
partner during their relationship.167 In a similar case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the trial court had equity jurisdiction to grant visitation between the former same-sex partner and
158. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 6.
159. See id. at 7.
160. See CM. v. J.M., 726 A.2d 998 (N.J. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1999) (finding husband
stated cause of action against wife's paramour where he discovered that the paramour was
the actual father of children the husband believed were his).
161. See Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624 (Mass. 1998) (comparative negligence does
apply in claim of legal malpractice claim because it is an action in tort, as well as in
contract).
162. See Rider v. Speaker, 692 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) (holding that passenger/
babysitter may be held liable for infant's injuries because of custodial relationship).
163. See Coward v. Owens-Corning, 729 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 1999) (concluding
that plaintiffs entitled to presumption that warning would have been followed where warnings are required to make product non-defective).
164. See, e.g., Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1999) (refusing to hold that
physician may be held liable for injuries suffered by a third party in an automobile accident
caused by physician's patient).
165. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 8 (citations omitted).
166. Id
167. SeeJA-L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314,1322 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that mother's
former domestic partner had standing to seek partial custody because she stood in loco
parentis to child).
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the child born during the relationship.168 In both of these cases, policy played an important role, and both courts relied on non-legal information about the increasing numbers of "non-traditional" families
in support of their decisions.169
These are but a few examples of the many common law cases of
first impression that come before state appellate courts every day.170
In many of these cases, courts explicitly balance considerations of public welfare in fashioning solutions.171 Even where considerations of
public policy are implicit, it is clear that policy plays a pivotal role in
the resolution of these cases. Appellate lawyers must be attuned to
common law cases where policy plays a role, and make effective policy
arguments in their appellate briefs.
B. Statutory Interpretation Cases
Because of the proliferation of statutes in the legal landscape,172
it is particularly important for lawyers to understand the role policy
can play in statutory interpretation cases. While courts' statutory opinions must inevitably be anchored in statutory language, when that language is general or open-ended the application of the language to a
concrete situation makes new law in much the same way common law
cases of first impression do. 173 The common law method informs state
and federal courts' statutory interpretation practices,174 making room
for the same kind of policy-based reasoning courts employ in common
law cases.
168. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890-92 (Mass. 1999) (finding that trial
court had equity jurisdiction to grant visitation rights to child's de facto parent, despite no
legal relationship).
169.

See id. at 891 (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

12-13 (1996)); JA.JL, 682 A.2d at 1320 8c n.3 (citations omitted) (commenting on the
"wide spectrum of arrangements filling the role of the traditional nuclear family" and citing a number of sources).
170. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 6-8.
171. See id.
172. See CALABRESI, supra note 157.
173. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 28. Statutory cases in which the language is dispositive
will rarely rise to the higher level appellate courts. For example, the United States Supreme
Court often takes statutory interpretation cases to resolve a split among the circuits, suggesting that the statute was easily capable of more than one interpretation. Thus, appellate
courts often need to resort to took other than statutory text in determining statutes* meanings. &*Schacter, supra note 134, at 20 8c n.63.
174. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 18-34 (discussing how state courts fill gaps in statutes
using common law method); Dorf, supra note 78, at 26-32 (asserting pervasiveness of common law method in all Supreme Court adjudication, including statutory cases).
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The proper method courts should apply in determining the
meaning of statutes has been a subject of great debate and discussion
over the last twenty years. This debate has occurred in the courts175
and among scholars.176 There are many different approaches judges
can take when interpreting the words of a statute and applying them
to new situations. Among the interpretive methodologies identified by
scholars are textualism, purposivism, intentionalism, and dynamic
statutory interpretation. 177 Recent scholarship has suggested, however, that the common law method plays a greater role in statutory
interpretation than do any of these other methods.178
Professor Dorf cites the Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.179 as an example of an opinion that

purports to be based primarily in text, but really reflects a common
law approach.180 In Oncale, the Court found Title VII does not bar a
claim of sexual harassment in which the harasser is of the same gender as the harassee.181 The actual text of Title VII makes it unlawful
for an employer to "discriminate because of . . . sex."182 While the
Court started its analysis with the statutory text, in arriving at its conclusion, the Court relied on earlier cases that recognized male-on-fe-

175. At the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has spearheaded the debate, arguing that
statutes should be interpreted based only on statutory language, without resort to legislative history or other interpretive devices. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
29-30 (1997); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227

(1994) (noting that, since 1986, the Court's practice has "reflected the influence of the
new textualisnT propounded by Justice Scalia).
176. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321 (1990) ("In the last decade, statutory interpretation
has reemerged as an important topic of academic theory and discussion.n). Another source
of the growth in scholarship on statutory interpretation is the law and literature movement, which has suggested that methods of literary criticism be applied to the interpretation of legal texts. See, e*g., Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of
Interdisciplznarity, 108 YALE LJ. 1059, 1065 (1999) (describing branch of law and literature
which focuses on literary theory to interpret texts).
177. For a concise overview of all these terms and an explanation of how they work, see
Peter Strauss, supra note 134, at 227-29.
178. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 28-31 (suggesting that "even textualist opinions in statutory cases exhibit common law properties"); Schacter, supra note 134, at 5 (arguing that
the Supreme Court's methodology in statutory cases "bears significant traces of the common law form because it draws from an array of judiciattycTedited sources to delineate the
range of plausible textual meanings and then to select from among them.").
179. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
180. For Professor Dorfs analysis, see Dorf, supra note 78, at 30.
181. See Oncale, 523 VS. at 82.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
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male sexual harassment as a form of discrimination,183 as well as other
cases dealing with a member of one group discriminating against another member of the same group.184 Thus, while statutory text played
a large role, the Court also gave substantial weight to previous cases,
building on them to arrive at its conclusion.185 This process of drawing on precedent to arrive at a conclusion is the common law method.
In a recent empirical study of the Supreme Courts statutory
cases, Professor Jane Schacter concluded that the best term to describe the Court's approach in statutory interpretation cases is "common law originalism."186 The Court is "originalist" because it "uses
statutory language as an interpretive anchor and focal point" 187 At
the same time, the court employs the common law method by drawing
on sources other than statutory text and the traditional tools of statutory interpretation.188 In particular, Professor Schacter found that the
Court cited to secondary sources such as books, law review articles,
and policy reports (statistics) in over half of the majority opinions.189
The Court's reliance on non-legal materials is not surprising in
light of Professor Schacter's most significant finding: in seventy-three
percent of the cases studied, the Court invoked policy norms that
were grounded in neither the statutory text nor the legislative history.190 This is the strongest indication of the Court's use of the common law method. The Court used policy norms in one of two ways.
First, the opinions suggested that a particular reading of the statute
would lead to desirable or adverse policy consequences.191 More specifically, the opinions would assert that a particular interpretation
would undermine values such as federalism, certainty, efficiency, or
predictability, even though none of those values were indicated in the
183. See Oncale, 523 US. at 78 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993);
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
184. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)).
185. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 30-31.
186. Schacter, supra note 134, at 19. Schacter's study was based on an analysis of all
cases from the Court's 1996 Term, which included any substantial discussion of the meaning of a federal statute. See id. at 10.
187. 7&at5.
188. See id. In the study, Professor Schacter analyzed the cases for nine different interpretive resources: 1) the statutory language; 2) legislative history; 3) other statutes or other
sections of the statute at issue; 4) judicial opinions; 5) canons of construction; 6) administrative material; secondary sources (including law review and newspaper articles, treatises,
other books, and policy reports); 8) dictionaries; and 9) miscellaneous. See id. ax 11-12.
189. See id. at 27 & 18 tbl.l.
190. See id. at 21; see also id. at 12.
191. See id. at 21.
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statute.192 Second, the opinions asserted that a particular statutory
reading would lead to certain policy consequences; the opinions then
argued Congress could not have intended that outcome.193 Essentially, the Court identified the policy against which to measure congressional intent, rather than trying to actually discern that intent.
The Court engaged injudicial policy-making much the way a common
law court would have.194
Thus, policy-based reasoning of the exact nature that calls upon
non-legal factual material for support195 plays an important role in
statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court, and presumably lower
federal courts as well. Policy also plays an important role in statutory
interpretation in the state courts, which tend to embrace the common
law method even more openly than did the federal courts.196 In part,
this is probably because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction,
while federal courts may only have jurisdiction over a dispute because
the United States Constitution is implicated or a federal statute
exists.197
Because state courts employ the common law method more
openly, they tend to move more fluidly between statutory and common law principles.198 Chief Judge Kaye openly acknowledges that
when the meaning of a statute is in dispute, the court employs the
common law process of "discerning and applying the purpose of the
192. See id. at 21-23. As an example, Professor Schacter points to Walters v. Metropolitan
Educ, Enters,, Inc., in which the Court found that, in determining whether an employer had
sufficient employees to be covered by Tide VII, a payroll based method for counting was
fair, and alternative methods would require a complex and expensive factual inquiry. See
Walters, 519 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1997). The opinion was driven by the policy concern of
efficiency, even though no such concern is indicated by the statute. See Schacter, supra note
134, at 21.
193. See Schacter, supra note 134, at 24-25. For example, in Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 128 (1997), the Court considered whether disability determinations
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers* Compensation Act ("LWHCA") should be
delayed until a worker's loss of earning capacity could be ascertained. Justice Souter's majority opinion found that such a delay would have too many practical problems, and that
Congress could not have intended this result See id at 129.
194. See id. zt 25.
195. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text
196. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 20.
197. S»Kaye,5t^ranotel53at20n.lll (citing 28 U.S.C § 1331) (1988) ("The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883,899 (1986) (M[S]tate courts... can fill any gap, as long
as no directive to the contrary exists. Federal judges by contrast... can fill in a gap only if
some enactment permits them to do so. . . .*).
198. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 25.
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law."199 This is particularly true because state statutes are rarely accompanied by extensive legislative history, leaving the court with nothing other than often unclear or vague statutory language.200 Common
law courts faced with interpreting vague or general statutory language
"have no choice but to 'make law' in circumstances where neither the
statutory text nor the 'legislative will' provides a single clear
answer."201
As in common law cases, a court exercising its law-making function within the context of interpreting a statute must often resort to
policy. Since state courts can openly make policy when the legislature
has not addressed an issue, the same courts should be able to make
policy when the legislature has spoken generally, but has not provided
clear guidance to the court.202 Where the legislature has indicated it
intends for something to be done about a particular issue, but not
what that something is, the court must assume its common law role
and fill that gap. 203
This is particularly true in cases in which the courts are asked to
apply a legislatively-created right or duty to facts clearly not contemplated by the legislature.204 In a high-profile example, the New York
Court of Appeals was asked to interpret the term "family member" in
the non-eviction provisions of the New York City rent control statute
to include the same-sex lover of the deceased tenant 205 In finding
that "family member" could be defined in this way, a plurality of the
court found that there was no indication of the legislature's intent on
the issue and employed a broad policy-based definition of family.206
Policy-based reasoning, then, can play an extremely important
role in statutory interpretation cases, both at the federal and state
level. While appellate lawyers writing briefs in statutory interpretation
cases should continue to make arguments based on statutory language
and legislative intent, they should not overlook the importance of policy arguments. Lawyers should not be afraid to go beyond policies explicitly stated by the legislature. Sound policy arguments grounded in
legislative fact can have a profound influence on the courts.
199. M a t 25.
200. See id. at 29-30.
201. Id. at 35-34.
202. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 286 (1989).
203. See id.
204. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 31.
205. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54-55 (N.Y. 1989).
206. See id.
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Constitutional Cases

Like statutes, constitutions are a source of positive law—a collection of written policies setting out governmental obligations and individual rights. As they do in statutory cases, courts interpreting
constitutions are bound to some degree by what the constitutions say.
In practice, however, constitutional text plays a small role compared
to evolving understandings of constitutional principles. 207 As a result,
judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions has even more similarities to the common law method than judicial interpretation of statutes. 208 The role the common law method plays suggests that in
constitutional cases of first impression, as in the other categories discussed above, policy arguments can play an important role.
Even more than statutes, constitutional provisions tend to be
open-ended and general. 2 0 9 The United States Constitution was
drafted in 1787, and has been amended twenty-six times since then. 210
The world we live in today is very different than the world of the Framers, and constitutional text is very like "a remote ancestor who came
over on the Mayflower. " 211 An elaborate body of case law has developed which plays a greater role in modern understanding of what the
Constitution requires than does the actual text 2 1 2 Indeed, most of the
major changes in American constitutional law have occurred without
any specific textual amendment. 2 1 3 These changes have occurred
gradually, as a result of changes in judicial decisions and in society at
large. 214 In other words, changes in constitutional doctrine occurred
207. See Strauss, supra note 135, at 877. Professor Strauss focuses on interpretation of
the United States Constitution and contends that, while there are times that constitutional
"text is decisive . . . some constitutional provisions are interpreted in ways that are difficult
to reconcile with the text," and some constitutional principles are enforced even though
they have no clear textual source. Id. at 880-81 (citations omitted).
208. See id. at 889-90.
209. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 32.
210. See Strauss, supra note 135, at 877; see also U.S. CONST, and amendments.
211. Dorf, supra note 78, at 27 (quoting Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 234 (1980)).
212. See Strauss, supra note 135, at 877.
213. See id. at 884. Examples of these changes include:
"the rise and fall of a constitutional freedom of contract; the great twentiethcentury growth in the power of the executive (especially in foreign affairs) and
the federal government generally; the civil rights era that began in the mid-twentieth century; the reformation of the criminal justice system . . . ; and the movement toward gender equality in the last few decades."
Id. Professor Strauss notes that the expansion of the congressional commerce power and
the enforcement of gender equality are particularly notable in that textual amendments to
bring about this change were rejected, "but the change occurred anyway." Id.
214. See id. at 905.
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through the common law method, rather than as a result of constitutional amendment
Several indicators support the proposition that the Court employs
the common law method in constitutional cases. Major changes in
constitutional principles occurred after old doctrines proved unstable
on their own terms, or after changes in society rendered old doctrines
inapplicable or wrong. 215 A classic example of the Court changing
constitutional doctrine as a result of changing societal norms is Brown
v. Board ofEducation,216 in which the Court overruled its previous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,217 and held that segregation in the public
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 218 Notably, the Court relied on empirical stxidies to support its finding that segregation of African-Americans "generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 219
Changes in constitutional doctrine are generally based on earlier
decisions as well as on considerations of public policy and social justice, 220 echoing the way changes are effected in the common law
method. The common law method has also played an important role
in the development of new constitutional rights.221 For example, the
right to abortion was derived largely from cases establishing the right
to contraception, which in turn was derived from cases involving a
right to educate one's child.222 Roe v. Wad^25 is another case in which
the Court relied on non-legal information—in this case medical science—to establish a new constitutional rule. 224 Thus, in two of the
most significant (and controversial) cases of this century, the Court
relied at least in part on policy and non-legal information to develop
important constitutional rules. While not all constitutional cases will
be of the same magnitude, lawyers should remain aware of the importance of policy arguments in federal constitutional cases.
215. See id.
216. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
217. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
218. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
219. M a t 494.
220. See Strauss, supra note 135, at 905-06.
221. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 29-30.
222. See id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152 (1973) (citing Griswoid v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
223. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
224. See id. zt 163.
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State courts ruling on novel issues under state constitutions rely
on social policy even more openly than do the federal courts.225 This
is especially important, as state courts increasingly afford greater protection to individual rights under their state constitutions than the
federal Constitution prescribes.226 Unlike federal courts, state courts
are not as bound by constitutional text, because state courts can always
create a common law remedy to a problem, while federal courts "must
decide either that a constitutional right has been violated or that it
has not."227 As a result, state courts move more fluidly between the
common law and state constitutional law, often using both as alternative grounds for the protection of individual rights.228
The state courts have an advantage in constitutional adjudication
because they can experiment by fashioning a common-law remedy
and monitor its progress before resting that same remedy on constitutional grounds. 229 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court established the right to free speech on private property under the state
constitution only after two decades of "experimentation" in applying
common law free speech principles to similar situations, thus shifting
a common law right to firmer constitutional grounds. 230
Because of this interplay between state constitutionalism and
state common law, and because a lawyer bringing a constitutional
claim in state court may find herself with a common law resolution,
policy once again plays a heightened role in state constitutional cases.
The state court's concern for public policy and the social good in
225. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 11-18. ChiefJudge Kaye asserts that "state courts effectively make law, and do so by reference to social policy, not only when deciding traditionally common law cases but also when faced with cases that involve difficult questions of
constitutional . . . interpretation." Id at 11. In State v.JewetU 500 A.2d 233 (Vt 1985), the
Vermont Supreme Court explicitly called on lawyers to provide "economic and sociological
materials" when briefing state constitutional claims. Id at 237.
226. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 13; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and
the States: The Revival ofState Constitutions as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
535, 548-50 (1986) (arguing that state courts can and should protect individual rights to
greater degree than do federal courts).
227. Kaye, supra note 153, at 17; see also Dorf, supra note 78, at 32.
228. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 15.
229. See id. at 17-18. Professor Dorf suggests that the federal courts ought to engage in
more experimentation, or "provisional adjudication," and proposes a series of reforms that
would encourage this practice. Currently, however, the federal courts do not tend to take
this approach. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 60-79.
230. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 17 (citing New Jersey Coalition Against War in the
Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 770-84 (N.J. 1994) (holding on state
constitutional grounds that speech is protected in shopping centers); and State v. Shack,
277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (resting their decision on "more satisfactory" common law
free speech grounds)).
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novel common law cases echoes in novel constitutional cases.231 Lawyers should learn to be aware of this interplay and make effective use
of policy in cases which have both common-law and constitutional
overtones.
Thus, novel cases which highlight gaps in the law, whether those
gaps be in the common law, statutes, or constitutions, are cases in
which courts turn to social welfare and policy.232 While precedent,
statutory and constitutional text, and traditional tools of legal decision-making play a role, courts also need "the legislator's wisdom"233
to fill the gaps. Legislator's wisdom includes factual information to
assist predicting the consequences of a new rule. Lawyers handling
cases which involve gaps in the law must take an active role in providing that information to the courts.
HI. Fear of Misuse and Ethical Considerations
A commonly expressed fear about die use of non-legal information introduced at the appellate level is its potential for misuse.234
Scholars have criticized judges' misuse of social science research,235
and expressed doubts about lawyers' skill in making use of such information.236 Non-legal information itself may be the product of biased,
advocacy-driven research.237 In spite of these reservations, the use of
non-legal information is too valuable to give up, and there are a
number of safeguards to mitigate the danger.
The fear of misuse falls into two broad categories. The first is that
judges and lawyers lack the competence to evaluate scientific and social science research and will not use it appropriately. Tew judges [or
lawyers] are trained in statistics, demography, psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology, or whatever the relevant social science material may
be.*238 Judges and lawyers may not have the ability to detect flaws in
231. See Kaye, supra note 153, at 17.
232. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 71.
233. M a t 115.
234. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 17, at 1542 (suggesting that judges' unrestricted use of
legislative facts is problematic); Rustad 8c Koenig, supra note 22, at 94 (noting that "the
Court is in danger of being misled by presentations of social science findings that are
distorted for partisan purposes").
235. See Bersoff 8c Glass, supra note 63, at 293; Faigman, supra note 17, at 604.
236.

See RICHARD NEELY, JUDICIAL JEOPARDY: WHEN BUSINESS COLLIDES WITH THE COURTS

148-49 (1986) (suggesting that most lawyers in business law firms have neither the skill nor
information to prepare effective Brandeis briefs).
237. See Louis B. Schwartz, Justice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 141,149-50
(1987) (describing the amanipulability,, of sociological data).
238. Saks, supra note 74, at 1026.
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research methodology, or distinguish valid studies from invalid
ones.289 Lawyers are trained to use information in the manner most
advantageous to the client, while social scientists are trained to test
hypotheses in a disinterested manner.240 As a result, judges and lawyers may mischaracterize sociological data, or stretch a research conclusion far beyond its legitimate limit.241
The second fear of misuse comes from distrust of the non-legal
materials themselves. Not all non-legal material is equally reliable. Scientific and social science studies can range from those which are thorough and competently executed to those which are poorly designed
and incompetently executed.242 Researchers can manipulate data, or
even doctor results in order to support desired results, and attribute
anomalous findings to occasional defects in the techniques employed.243 Some research studies might be preliminary, not designed
or intended to be used to predict the effect of a legal rule. On the
other end of the spectrum, studies may be financed by partisan advocacy groups, with findings crafted to advance the purposes of the
funding source.244
These fears are all justified. Social science and other types of nonlegal material do have the potential for misuse. The solution, however, cannot be to reject the use of this valuable resource. First, because research suggests courts are using this resource with greater
frequency, it is unlikely they will revert back.245 Second, and more importantly, there is no reason to believe that judicial decisions will be
better for ignoring available information and failing to consider the
real-world implications of a legal rule.246 Decisions made based on an
absence of information cannot be better than those based on imperfectly understood information.247 In addition, it is rare that a court
239. See Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority, supra note 20, at 509.
240. See Rustad 8c Koenig, supra note 22, at 117-19.
241. See Bersoff 8c Glass, supra note 63, at 293; Faigman, supra note 17, at 550.
242. See Saks, supra note 74, at 1016; see also Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority, supra
note 20, at 498-508 (suggesting criteria by which courts can evaluate research studies to
determine their scientific worth).
243. See Schwartz, supra note 237, at 149-50 (citing STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 85 (1981)). Professor Schwartz contends that social science undermines
judicial decision-making by the: "(i) fallibility of economics and other social sciences
(often combined with illusory certainty based on statistics and graphs); and (ii) the logical
impossibility that a social science conclusion . . . could dictate a judicial conclusion
Id. at 143.
244. See Rustad 8c Koenig, supra note 22, at 143.
245. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text
246. See Saks, supra note 74, at 1015.
247. See id. at 1028.
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will render a decision based solely on non-legal information. Precedent, principle, and text continue to play a prominent role in legal
decision-making.248
There are several safeguards which prevent extreme misuse of
non-legal information in appellate briefs and opinions. First, lawyers
and judges can acquire sufficient knowledge of research methods to
make basic judgments about most research studies.249 In addition, lawyers have an ethical obligation not to perpetrate a fraud on the
court250 A lawyer cannot knowingly make a legal argument based on
a false representation of law.251 Because non-legal materials perform
the same function in supporting a policy argument as do cases and
statutes in supporting a legal argument, this general ethical prohibition should apply. Lawyers should not openly and knowingly misrepresent non-legal material such as statistical findings or economic
theories in the context of making an argument in a brief. This should
curb the most egregious misuses of non-legal materials.
There is no doubt, however, that within the bounds of these ethical proscriptions, lawyers advocating on behalf of their clients will
stretch the use of non-legal materials to their limits; it is the nature of
the adversary system.252 The advocate's job is to present information
in a light most favorable to the client; it is expected that this presentation will be biased.253 Ultimately it is up to the court to evaluate the
information proffered in support of an argument, and to determine
its reliability and persuasive value.
A court's role in evaluating non-legal information is really no different than its role in evaluating other sources of authority provided
in a brief.254 Just as a court would not necessarily rely on the characterization of case law in a brief without reading the case and conducting "extra-record* research, the court should not rely on the
248. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text
249. See Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority, supra note 20, at 511 n.l 19 (pointing out
that alaw professors, lawyers, and judges have, for a long time, learned and used technical
vocabularies which have developed outside the law").
250.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1999). This Rule provides,

in relevant part, that: "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;... or (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." Id.
251. See id. at a n t 3.
252. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Improving APA Science Translation Amicus Briefs, 17 LAW 8C
HUM. BEHAV. 235, 237-38 (1993).
253. See id.
254. See Saks, supra note 74, at 1023.
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characterization of sociological data without evaluating the source.255
It is the court's obligation to uget it right" even if the parties have
not.256 Even so, courts might be careless,257 or might arrive at the
"wrong answer" even after significant effort,258 or might intentionally
misuse non-legal information to justify an end. 259
That the use of non-legal materials in appellate briefs is "messy"
and subject to abuse is not a reason to avoid using them. The same
reasoning could be used to avoid use of almost any source of authority. Yet a lawyer's job is not to shy away from using authority, but to
embrace it, search for it diligendy,260 and use it effectively in constructing arguments. A competent lawyer should be aware of ethical
constraints and potential for misuse, but should not let these concerns
prevent her from making effective use of non-legal materials as authority in a brief.
Conclusion
Non-legal materials in support of policy arguments can be a powerful tool for argument in an appellate brief. Lawyers should be aware
of this possibility and make effective use of such materials where appropriate. Professor Dorf suggests that the Supreme Court needs to
lead the way by relying more openly on empirical and policy analysis
in its opinions, encouraging lead counsel to follow suit 261 While this
would be an important step, lawyers should not forgo the use of a
powerful tool of persuasion while waiting for the courts to take the
lead. Lawyers should take an active role in using non-legal materials as
authority in appellate briefs, and law schools should take a more active role in educating prospective lawyers about effectively use nonlegal authority.
This article has taken a first step in identifying the issues lawyers
and students should be aware of when formulating arguments and
255. See id. Several scholars have proposed methods for courts to use in evaluating
scientific and social science research. See, e.g., Monahan 8c Walker, Social Authority, supra
note 20, at 499 (proposing four criteria by which to evaluate research).
256. Saks, supra note 74, at 1028.
257. &*uiatl013.
258. See xa\ at 1029. Professor Saks reviews several ways in which errors of this nature
can be corrected: "Higher courts can review the issue. Commentators may criticize the
court. The legislature can supplant the court's rule. The court can even overrule itself on a
later occasion.* Id.
259. See Bersoff 8c Glass, supra note 63, at 293; Faigman, supra note 17, at 549.
260.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1999) (requiring lawyers to

act with reasonable diligence in representing a client).
261. See Dorf, supra note 78, at 56.
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drafting briefs that include policy arguments. Further scholarship is
needed to address more specifically how and in what context the uses
of non-legal information can be taught. The ethical obligation to use
non-legal materials must be more thoroughly addressed. Legal research and writing teachers need to think about how effective policy
arguments should be structured, and how to effectively search for
non-legal materials. More attention should be devoted to what kinds
of non-legal materials are most useful in different kinds of cases. It is
time to turn more attention to this increasingly important part of
modern legal decision-making.

